What Russian, reading the account of the last part of the campaign of 1812, has not experienced an uncomfortable feeling of regret, dissatisfaction, and perplexity? Who has not asked himself how it is that the French were not all captured or destroyed when our three armies surrounded them in superior numbers, when the disordered French, hungry and freezing, surrendered in crowds, and when (as the historians relate) the aim of the Russians was to stop the French, to cut them off, and capture them all?
How was it that the Russian army, which when numerically weaker than the French had given battle at Borodino, did not achieve its purpose when it had surrounded the French on three sides and when its aim was to capture them? Can the French be so enormously superior to us that when we had surrounded them with superior forces we could not beat them? How could that happen?
History (or what is called by that name) replying to these questions says that this occurred because Kutuzov and Tormasov and Chichagov, and this man and that man, did not execute such and such maneuvers...
But why did they not execute those maneuvers? And why if they were guilty of not carrying out a prearranged plan were they not tried and punished? But even if we admitted that Kutuzov, Chichagov, and others were the cause of the Russian failures, it is still incomprehensible why, the position of the Russian army being what it was at Krasnoe and at the Berezina (in both cases we had superior forces), the French army with its marshals, kings, and Emperor was not captured, if that was what the Russians aimed at.
The explanation of this strange fact given by Russian military historians (to the effect that Kutuzov hindered an attack) is unfounded, for we know that he could not restrain the troops from attacking at Vyazma and Tarutino.
Why was the Russian army- which with inferior forces had withstood the enemy in full strength at Borodino- defeated at Krasnoe and the Berezina by the disorganized crowds of the French when it was numerically superior?
If the aim of the Russians consisted in cutting off and capturing Napoleon and his marshals- and that aim was not merely frustrated but all attempts to attain it were most shamefully baffled- then this last period of the campaign is quite rightly considered by the French to be a series of victories, and quite wrongly considered victorious by Russian historians.
The Russian military historians in so far as they submit to claims of logic must admit that conclusion, and in spite of their lyrical rhapsodies about valor, devotion, and so forth, must reluctantly admit that the French retreat from Moscow was a series of victories for Napoleon and defeats for Kutuzov.
But putting national vanity entirely aside one feels that such a conclusion involves a contradiction, since the series of French victories brought the French complete destruction, while the series of Russian defeats led to the total destruction of their enemy and the liberation of their country.
The source of this contradiction lies in the fact that the historians studying the events from the letters of the sovereigns and the generals, from memoirs, reports, projects, and so forth, have attributed to this last period of the war of 1812 an aim that never existed, namely that of cutting off and capturing Napoleon with his marshals and his army.
There never was or could have been such an aim, for it would have been senseless and its attainment quite impossible.
It would have been senseless, first because Napoleon's disorganized army was flying from Russia with all possible speed, that is to say, was doing just what every Russian desired. So what was the use of performing various operations on the French who were running away as fast as they possibly could?
Secondly, it would have been senseless to block the passage of men whose whole energy was directed to flight.
Thirdly, it would have been senseless to sacrifice one's own troops in order to destroy the French army, which without external interference was destroying itself at such a rate that, though its path was not blocked, it could not carry across the frontier more than it actually did in December, namely a hundredth part of the original army.
Fourthly, it would have been senseless to wish to take captive the Emperor, kings, and dukes- whose capture would have been in the highest degree embarrassing for the Russians, as the most adroit diplomatists of the time (Joseph de Maistre and others) recognized. Still more senseless would have been the wish to capture army corps of the French, when our own army had melted away to half before reaching Krasnoe and a whole division would have been needed to convoy the corps of prisoners, and when our men were not always getting full rations and the prisoners already taken were perishing of hunger.
All the profound plans about cutting off and capturing Napoleon and his army were like the plan of a market gardener who, when driving out of his garden a cow that had trampled down the beds he had planted, should run to the gate and hit the cow on the head. The only thing to be said in excuse of that gardener would be that he was very angry. But not even that could be said for those who drew up this project, for it was not they who had suffered from the trampled beds.
But besides the fact that cutting off Napoleon with his army would have been senseless, it was impossible.
It was impossible first because- as experience shows that a three-mile movement of columns on a battlefield never coincides with the plans- the probability of Chichagov, Kutuzov, and Wittgenstein effecting a junction on time at an appointed place was so remote as to be tantamount to impossibility, as in fact thought Kutuzov, who when he received the plan remarked that diversions planned over great distances do not yield the desired results.
Secondly it was impossible, because to paralyze the momentum with which Napoleon's army was retiring, incomparably greater forces than the Russians possessed would have been required.
Thirdly it was impossible, because the military term "to cut off" has no meaning. One can cut off a slice of bread, but not an army. To cut off an army- to bar its road- is quite impossible, for there is always plenty of room to avoid capture and there is the night when nothing can be seen, as the military scientists might convince themselves by the example of Krasnoe and of the Berezina. It is only possible to capture prisoners if they agree to be captured, just as it is only possible to catch a swallow if it settles on one's hand. Men can only be taken prisoners if they surrender according to the rules of strategy and tactics, as the Germans did. But the French troops quite rightly did not consider that this suited them, since death by hunger and cold awaited them in flight or captivity alike.
Fourthly and chiefly it was impossible, because never since the world began has a war been fought under such conditions as those that obtained in 1812, and the Russian army in its pursuit of the French strained its strength to the utmost and could not have done more without destroying itself.
During the movement of the Russian army from Tarutino to Krasnoe it lost fifty thousand sick or stragglers, that is a number equal to the population of a large provincial town. Half the men fell out of the army without a battle.
And it is of this period of the campaign- when the army lacked boots and sheepskin coats, was short of provisions and without vodka, and was camping out at night for months in the snow with fifteen degrees of frost, when there were only seven or eight hours of daylight and the rest was night in which the influence of discipline cannot be maintained, when men were taken into that region of death where discipline fails, not for a few hours only as in a battle, but for months, where they were every moment fighting death from hunger and cold, when half the army perished in a single month- it is of this period of the campaign that the historians tell us how Miloradovich should have made a flank march to such and such a place, Tormasov to another place, and Chichagov should have crossed (more than knee-deep in snow) to somewhere else, and how so-and-so "routed" and "cut off" the French and so on and so on.
The Russians, half of whom died, did all that could and should have been done to attain an end worthy of the nation, and they are not to blame because other Russians, sitting in warm rooms, proposed that they should do what was impossible.
All that strange contradiction now difficult to understand between the facts and the historical accounts only arises because the historians dealing with the matter have written the history of the beautiful words and sentiments of various generals, and not the history of the events.
To them the words of Miloradovich seem very interesting, and so do their surmises and the rewards this or that general received; but the question of those fifty thousand men who were left in hospitals and in graves does not even interest them, for it does not come within the range of their investigation.
Yet one need only discard the study of the reports and general plans and consider the movement of those hundreds of thousands of men who took a direct part in the events, and all the questions that seemed insoluble easily and simply receive an immediate and certain solution.
The aim of cutting off Napoleon and his army never existed except in the imaginations of a dozen people. It could not exist because it was senseless and unattainable.
The people had a single aim: to free their land from invasion. That aim was attained in the first place of itself, as the French ran away, and so it was only necessary not to stop their flight. Secondly it was attained by the guerrilla warfare which was destroying the French, and thirdly by the fact that a large Russian army was following the French, ready to use its strength in case their movement stopped.
The Russian army had to act like a whip to a running animal. And the experienced driver knew it was better to hold the whip raised as a menace than to strike the running animal on the head.
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Book One: 1805 - Chapter XVIII
Book One: 1805 - Chapter XXIII
Book One: 1805 - Chapter XXVII
Book One: 1805 - Chapter XXVIII
Book Two: 1805 - Chapter XVIII
Book Three: 1805 - Chapter III
Book Three: 1805 - Chapter VII
Book Three: 1805 - Chapter VIII
Book Three: 1805 - Chapter XII
Book Three: 1805 - Chapter XIII
Book Three: 1805 - Chapter XIV
Book Three: 1805 - Chapter XVI
Book Three: 1805 - Chapter XVII
Book Three: 1805 - Chapter XVIII
Book Three: 1805 - Chapter XIX
Book Four: 1806 - Chapter VIII
Book Four: 1806 - Chapter XIII
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter I
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter II
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter III
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter IV
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter V
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter VI
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter VII
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter VIII
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter IX
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter X
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter XI
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter XII
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter XIII
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter XIV
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter XV
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter XVI
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter XVII
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter XVIII
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter XIX
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter XX
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter XXI
Book Five: 1806-07 - Chapter XXII
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter II
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter III
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter IV
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter VI
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter VII
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter VIII
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter IX
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XI
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XII
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XIII
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XIV
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XV
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XVI
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XVII
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XVIII
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XIX
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XX
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XXI
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XXII
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XXIII
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XXIV
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XXV
Book Six: 1808-10 - Chapter XXVI
Book Seven: 1810-11 - Chapter I
Book Seven: 1810-11 - Chapter II
Book Seven: 1810-11 - Chapter III
Book Seven: 1810-11 - Chapter IV
Book Seven: 1810-11 - Chapter V
Book Seven: 1810-11 - Chapter VI
Book Seven: 1810-11 - Chapter VII
Book Seven: 1810-11 - Chapter VIII
Book Seven: 1810-11 - Chapter IX
Book Seven: 1810-11 - Chapter X
Book Seven: 1810-11 - Chapter XI
Book Seven: 1810-11 - Chapter XII
Book Seven: 1810-11 - Chapter XIII
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter I
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter II
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter III
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter IV
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter V
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter VI
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter VII
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter VIII
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter IX
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter X
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter XI
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter XII
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter XIII
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter XIV
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter XV
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter XVI
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter XVII
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter XVIII
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter XIX
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter XX
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter XXI
Book Eight: 1811-12 - Chapter XXII
Book Nine: 1812 - Chapter VIII
Book Nine: 1812 - Chapter XIII
Book Nine: 1812 - Chapter XVII
Book Nine: 1812 - Chapter XVIII
Book Nine: 1812 - Chapter XXII
Book Nine: 1812 - Chapter XXIII
Book Ten: 1812 - Chapter XVIII
Book Ten: 1812 - Chapter XXIII
Book Ten: 1812 - Chapter XXVII
Book Ten: 1812 - Chapter XXVIII
Book Ten: 1812 - Chapter XXXII
Book Ten: 1812 - Chapter XXXIII
Book Ten: 1812 - Chapter XXXIV
Book Ten: 1812 - Chapter XXXVI
Book Ten: 1812 - Chapter XXXVII
Book Ten: 1812 - Chapter XXXVIII
Book Ten: 1812 - Chapter XXXIX
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter II
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter III
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter IV
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter VI
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter VII
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter VIII
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter IX
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XI
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XII
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XIII
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XIV
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XV
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XVI
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XVII
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XVIII
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XIX
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XX
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XXI
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XXII
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XXIII
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XXIV
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XXV
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XXVI
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XXVII
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XXVIII
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XXIX
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XXX
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XXXI
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XXXII
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XXXIII
Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter XXXIV
Book Twelve: 1812 - Chapter II
Book Twelve: 1812 - Chapter III
Book Twelve: 1812 - Chapter IV
Book Twelve: 1812 - Chapter VI
Book Twelve: 1812 - Chapter VII
Book Twelve: 1812 - Chapter VIII
Book Twelve: 1812 - Chapter IX
Book Twelve: 1812 - Chapter XI
Book Twelve: 1812 - Chapter XII
Book Twelve: 1812 - Chapter XIII
Book Twelve: 1812 - Chapter XIV
Book Twelve: 1812 - Chapter XV
Book Twelve: 1812 - Chapter XVI
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter I
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter II
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter III
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter IV
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter V
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter VI
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter VII
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter VIII
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter IX
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter X
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter XI
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter XII
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter XIII
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter XIV
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter XV
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter XVI
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter XVII
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter XVIII
Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter XIX
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter I
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter II
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter III
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter IV
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter V
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter VI
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter VII
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter VIII
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter IX
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter X
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter XI
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter XII
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter XIII
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter XIV
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter XV
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter XVI
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter XVII
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter XVIII
Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter XIX
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter I
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter II
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter III
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter IV
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter V
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter VI
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter VII
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter VIII
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter IX
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter X
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter XI
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter XII
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter XIII
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter XIV
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter XV
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter XVI
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter XVII
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter XVIII
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter XIX
Book Fifteen: 1812-13 - Chapter XX
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter I
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter II
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter III
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter IV
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter V
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter VI
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter VII
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter VIII
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter IX
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter X
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter XI
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter XII
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter XIII
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter XIV
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter XV
First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter XVI
Second Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter I
Second Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter II
Second Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter III
Second Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter IV
Second Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter V
Second Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter VI
Second Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter VII
Second Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter VIII
Second Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter IX
Second Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter X